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Harman Gilbert: more books (34)

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME LXXIII, NUMBER 17 OCTOBER 7, 1976 DOUBLE ISSUE: by Gilbert Harman, Mark Pastin, Fred Fe The Journal of Philosophy) [R. A. Fumerton, 1976-01-01
Semantics of Natural Language by Donald & Gilbert Harman (eds.) Davidson, 1972
The Floating Bear #11 by Gilbert, William Burroughs, Charles Olson, Peter Harman, Robert Kelley, Denise Levertov, Larry Eigner, and Fred Kerko) JONES, LeRoi [Amiri Baraka] and Diane Di Prima, edited by (SORRENTINO, 1961
RELATIVISM.: An entry from Charles Scribner's Sons' <i>New Dictionary of the History of Ideas</i> by Robert Johnson, 2005
Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind. (Summaries And Comments).(Review): An article from: The Review of Metaphysics by Alex Orenstein, 2000-12-01

lists with details

Bibliography Of Cognitive Science And Ethics
harman, gilbert. forthcoming. Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy.Value Inquiry. harman, gilbert. 1999. Moral Philosophy and Linguistics .
http://hem.passagen.se/ollekillen/cogethics.html

Extractions: Research Sources on Concepts of Person and Self This is a bibliography of material where issues in moral philosophy are engaged with the theoretical tools of the cognitive sciences. Most items bear primarily on moral psychology and epistemology. The authors included here are applying concepts and theories from the cognitive sciences in ethics, rather than investigating research and theories in those sciences from a moral point of view. The bibliography is organized into the following seven sections: Since these different subject areas overlap, some items may fit in several of them but are only listed once. Blomberg, Olle. 2003.
Research Interests - Linda Halls
Locality KEY. BALCHIN, CUTTS, DANIEL, DRIVER, gilbert, harman, HAYES, HODGSON, ILLINGWORTH,KING, McGUINNESS, McMILLAN, O GORMAN, SWAINE, THRIFT, WINN, WYNN, WYNNE, Nov 1,2001.
http://members.iinet.net.au/~perthdps/research/hal02.html
G Harman - ResearchIndex Document Query
harman, gilbert (1982)Conceptual Role Semantics www.unikonstanz.de/FuF/Philo/Philosophie/Spohn/papers/Concepts1.psTry your query at Amazon Barnes Noble
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cis?q=G. Harman
An Infallible Method, Fallible Practioners: Descartes' Epistemology
gilbert harman discusses the idea of a reasoned change in view. ReferencesDescartes, Rene. Meditations harman, gilbert. Reasoned Change in View.
http://www.dons.net.au/~nevre/zach/phil/descartes.html

Extractions: Descartes begins his contemplation of a method by noting that he has, at one time or another, taken as true many propositions he later found to be false (I 117). Later, by considering the possibility that he may be dreaming or being deceived by some demon, he realizes that almost everything he has taken to be true is less than certain (II 13). In light of these considerations, he concludes that it is best to discard all the beliefs he has formerly taken as true. His path to knowledge will begin with a blank page, so as not to be cluttered with any falsehoods (I 117). In this exposition Descartes explicitly states that his goal is to assert only that which is absolutely certain, 'Even if I make but little progress I should at least be sure not to fall,' (I 119). Gilbert Harman begins his discussion of reasoned change of view with the example of a woman considering what to eat for breakfast (1). This practical example belies his practical goals. Harman attempts to give a much more descriptive account of reasoned change in view, as compared to Descartes' prescriptive account. Or, if Harman's account is to be taken as prescriptive, he sets very different goals than Descartes. Descartes specifically states that he is interested only in the indubitable, 'I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are patently false,' (II 12). Harman, on the other hand, does not state his goal directly, but it is clear in his discussion that he wishes to outline principles of reasoned change in view that allow one to accept uncertain propositions as true (4-5, as well as much of chapter 3).
Epistemology
harman, gilbert. 1970. Induction, in Marshall Swain, ed., Induction, Acceptance,and Rational Belief. Dordrecht D. Reidel. harman, gilbert. 1984.
http://www.geocities.com/black_tim/philosophy_6300.htm

Extractions: epistemology Philosophy 5300/6300 University of Utah Spring 2003 Lecture Notes John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruzs Foundations Theories PDF John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruzs Coherence Theories PDF Alvin I. Goldmans What is justified belief? PDF Alvin I. Goldmans Discrimination and perceptual knowledge PDF Fred Dretskes The pragmatic dimension of knowledge PDF David Lewiss Elusive knowledge PDF Laurence BonJours Externalist theories of empirical knowledge PDF William P. Alstons Internalism and externalism in epistemology PDF Alvin I. Goldmans Internalism exposed PDF Ernest Sosas Philosophical scepticism and epistemic circularity PDF Christopher S. Hill, Process reliabilism and cartesian scepticism PDF Instructor: Tim Black Class meets: Tuesdays and Thursdays; 10:45 a.m.-12:05 p.m. in OSH 336 Office hours: Tuesdays and Thursdays; 1:30 p.m.-2:45 p.m. ; other hours by appointment Office: OSH 341K Office phone: Instructors email: tim.black@philosophy.utah.edu I invite you to visit me during my office hours and to talk with me via telephone and e-mail. I always welcome your comments and questions, and I am exceptionally happy to talk with you about the course material or about other philosophical or administrative matters. Department office: OSH 341 Department phone: Aims of the Course: This course will focus on epistemological theories, emphasizing in particular the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology, and on the ways in which these theories are employed in addressing the issue of skepticism about the external world.
Bibliography
harman, gilbert, Thought, (Princeton NJ Princeton University Press,1973). harman, gilbert, Knowledge, Inference and Explanation
http://www.geocities.com/villealfa/to_know_bibliography.html

Extractions: Bibliography Ayer, AJ, Language, Truth and Logic, (New York: Dover, 1952) Bach, Kent: Thought and Reference, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) Bonjour, Laurence, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986) Crimmins Mark, Talk About Beliefs, (MA: MIT Press, 1992) Dretske, Fred, Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) Goldman Alvin, Epistemology and Cognition, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986) Harman, Gilbert, Thought, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973) Hookway, Christopher, Scepticism, (New York: Routledge, 1992) Lewis, David, Papers in Philosophical Logic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) Lewis, David, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) Moore, G. E., Philosophical Papers, (New York: Collier Books, 1962) Nozick, Robert, Philosophical Explanations, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1981) Pappas, G., and Swain, M.(eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification, (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1978) Pollock, John, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, (London: Hutchinson, 1987)
Subj & R
harman, gilbert, 1999, Reasoning, Meaning and Mind, Oxford, OxfordUniversity Press. harman, gilbert, 1995, Rationality, in
http://www.letras.up.pt/df/if/gfmc/subj___r.html

Extractions: Unidade de Investigação da financiada pela Projecto 3: Subjectividade e Racionalidade BLACKBURN, Simon, 1998, Ruling Passions A Theory of Practical Reasoning, Oxford, Oxford University Press. CHERNIAK, Christopher, 1986, Minimal Rationality, Cambridge MA, MIT Press. CHERNIAK, Christopher, Rationality, in GUTTENPLAN, S. (ed.) 1994, A Companion to The Philosophy of Mind , Oxford, Blackwell. COHEN, J.L, 1981, Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences COUTO SOARES, Luísa, 2002, Crença DAVIDSON, Donald, 1980, Hempel on Explaining Action, in DAVIDSON, Donald, 1980, Essays on Actions and Events , Oxford, Oxford University Press. DAVIDSON, Donald, 1982, Rational Animals, Dialectica, 36, nº4. DENNETT, Daniel, 1987, Making Sense of Ourselves, in DENNETT, Daniel, 1987, The Intentional Stance, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
Spirit And Sky Philosophy: Philosophers: H
Huxley, Thomas Henry (12) Hypatia of Alexandria (12). Home philosophy philosophers h. Links harman, gilbert harman, gilbert.
http://www.spiritandsky.com/philosophy/philosophers/h/
Tmecca.co.kr
HOME DETAIL, Explaining Value and Other Essaysin Moral Philosophy by harman, gilbert. List Price $ 70.00. Our
http://www.tmecca.co.kr/search/Tmecca_Detail.html?isbnstr=0198238053
Normativ Begrunnelse
harman, gilbert. 1996. I gilbert harman og Judith Jarvis Thomson (red.), Moral Relativismand Moral Objectivity, Cambridge, Mass. Blackwell. Kagan, Shelly.
http://www.statsvitenskap.uio.no/fag/polit/kurs/v2004/normativbegrunnelse.html

Extractions: UiO - nettsider UiO - personer BIBSYS - forfatter BIBSYS - tittel WWW - Google Om UiO Studier Studentliv For ansatte ... Publikasjoner Kursansvarlig: Raino Malnes Tidspunkt: Sted: Institutt for statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo (rom kunngjøres senere) Tid: Alle dager 09.15 - 16 Kursbeskrivelse: Å begrunne et normativt utsagn er å vise til noe som taler for å tro på utsagnet. Stilt overfor et bestemt utsagn kan man spørre: Finnes en god begrunnelse for dette? Mer generelt kan man spørre: Hva er det i alminnelighet som trengs (det vil si, hva slags argumentasjon skal til) for å gi god begrunnelse for utsagn av dette slaget? Man kan også spørre: Lar normative utsagn seg i det hele tatt begrunne? Disse spørsmålene behandles i kurset. Noen forelesninger har allmenn, teoretisk tematikk; noen handler om argumentasjon knyttet til konkrete saker. Evaluering: Kursplan: Deskriptiv og normativ begrunnelse: elementære og ikke fullt så elementære distinksjoner Litteratur : Engelstad et al, 2004* (40 s.)
Blackwell Synergy - Cookie Absent
41. , harman, gilbert. (1986) Change In View(Cambridge, MA MIT Press)., harman, gilbert. (1999) Practical Reasoning . Reprinted
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00462.x/enha

Extractions: Home An Error Occurred Setting Your User Cookie A cookie is a small amount of information that a web site copies onto your hard drive. Synergy uses cookies to improve performance by remembering that you are logged in when you go from page to page. If the cookie cannot be set correctly, then Synergy cannot determine whether you are logged in and a new session will be created for each page you visit. This slows the system down. Therefore, you must accept the Synergy cookie to use the system. What Gets Stored in a Cookie? Synergy only stores a session ID in the cookie, no other information is captured. In general, only the information that you provide, or the choices you make while visiting a web site, can be stored in a cookie. For example, the site cannot determine your email name unless you choose to type it. Allowing a web site to create a cookie does not give that or any other site access to the rest of your computer, and only the site that created the cookie can read it. Please read our for more information about data collected on this site.
Blackwell Synergy - Cookie Absent
Category Mistakes in M E. gilbert harman 1. To cite this article harman, gilbert(2003) Category Mistakes in M E. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1), 165180.
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2003.00007.x/enha

Extractions: Home An Error Occurred Setting Your User Cookie A cookie is a small amount of information that a web site copies onto your hard drive. Synergy uses cookies to improve performance by remembering that you are logged in when you go from page to page. If the cookie cannot be set correctly, then Synergy cannot determine whether you are logged in and a new session will be created for each page you visit. This slows the system down. Therefore, you must accept the Synergy cookie to use the system. What Gets Stored in a Cookie? Synergy only stores a session ID in the cookie, no other information is captured. In general, only the information that you provide, or the choices you make while visiting a web site, can be stored in a cookie. For example, the site cannot determine your email name unless you choose to type it. Allowing a web site to create a cookie does not give that or any other site access to the rest of your computer, and only the site that created the cookie can read it. Please read our for more information about data collected on this site.
EpistPapersBySubject.html
harman, gilbert. General Foundations vs. Rational Insight . Hookway, Christopher. harman,gilbert. Skepticism and Foundations . Hawley, Patrick.
http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/~kak7409/EpistPapersBySubject.html

Extractions: What follows are the links to epistemology papers online organized loosely by subject. To keep updating manageable, each paper appears only under one subject heading. Please send comments, suggestions, or recommended links to Dr. Keith Korcz at keithk@louisiana.edu Last Modified: 4/23/04 Links are up to date as of 8/03. A Priori Knowledge Bergmann, Gustav "Synthetic A Priori" (selection from Logic and Reality, 1967) Brown, Jessica. "The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access" Casullo, Albert. "A Priori Knowledge" "A Priori Knowledge Appraised" "Modal Epistemology: Fortune or Virtue?" Chalmers, David J. "Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?"
Reply To Harman
Reply to gilbert harman s comments on How to Get an Ought from a Biological Is an ancestor of From Is to Ought Another Way (182K) delivered at the
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/~postjf/reply2gh.htm

Extractions: "Reply to Harman" Reply to Gilbert Harman's comments on " How to Get an Ought from a Biological Is " an ancestor of " From Is to Ought: Another Way " (182K) delivered at the at the Invited Symposium on the Evolution of Norms, APA Pacific Division meeting, Albuquerque, April 7, 2000. Comments welcome! john.f.post@vanderbilt.edu Home Place Anyone who advances an argument congenial to moral realism, as I do in " How to Get an Ought from a Biological Is ," had better take Gilbert Harman very seriously. Much of my theory, therefore, is designed with him in mind, specifically certain maneuvers through the minefield of conditions on any adequate naturalistic theory of objective normativity. To repeat, the theory must (i) conform to Hume's Law (ii) escape the Open Question Argument (OQA) (iii) escape the Argument from Queerness (AQ) (iv) preserve the gap between how x actually behaves or is disposed to behave and how x should behave (v) explain how the matter of whether x has a normative property N is determined solely by objective affairs and (vi) accord N an appropriate explanatory role. By my count, nearly 80% of the text concerns
200 OK
i have an after market Sony MP80 on my mini cooper can i still connect itto the harman kardon system? gilbert Cabral / November 02, 2003 1106 PM.
http://www.motoringfile.com/2003/05/12/TheHarmanKardonStereoSystemReviewed
Untitled
harman, gilbert (1986), A plea for the study of reasoning och Logic and reasoning ,kapitel 1 and 2 ur Change in view, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
http://www.cs.umu.se/kurser/TDBC12/HT99/harman.html

Extractions: Reasoning as Reasoned Change in View ever part of reasoning. (I discuss this question briefly in chapter 8.) Nevertheless, in what follows I assume there is a definite difference between immediate changes that are part of a given segment of reasoning and other less immediate changes that are merely further effects of it. And I also assume there is a distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning. These assumptions suggest a further distinction between two sorts of rules of reasoning, corresponding to two possible phases in reasoning. On the one hand there is often a process of reflection in which one thinks about one's beliefs, plans, desires, etc. and envisions various possibilities in more or less detail. On the other hand there is the actual revising of one's view, which may or may not follow such a reflection. Maxims of reflection Not all principles of psychological change are principles of revision in this sense, since not all changes are instances of reasoning. For example, it may be that changes in desires are not instances of reasoning, although these changes can occur as a result of reasoning. Even so, there may be general principles governing changes in desires. These would be principles of change that were not principles of revision in the relevant sense.
Special Issues Of Journals Devoted To DANIEL C. DENNETT
harman, gilbert. Adaptationist Theorizing and Intentional System Theory, p.365. Heil, John. harman, gilbert. What is the Intentional Stance? p. 515.
http://sun3.lib.uci.edu/~scctr/philosophy/dennett/special_issues.html

Extractions: Beatty, John. "Rationality: Putting the Issue to the Scientific Community," pp. Bennett, Jonathan. "Cognitive Ethology: Theory or Poetry?" pp. Churchland, Patricia Smith. "Dennett's Instrumentalism: A Frog at the Bottom of the Drug," pp. Danto, Arthur C. "Science as an Intentional System," pp. Dawkins, Richard. "Adaptationism was Always Predictive and Needed No Defense," pp. Eldredge, Niles. "A la Recherche du Docteur Pangloss," pp. Ghiselin, Michael T. "Lloyd Morgan's Canon in Evolutionary Context," pp. Graham, George. "Denoting and Demoting Intentional Systems," pp. Griffin, Donald R. "Thinking about Animal Thoughts," p. 364. Harman, Gilbert. "Adaptationist Theorizing and Intentional System Theory," p. 365.
References
harman, gilbert. 1977. The nature of morality an introduction to ethics. New YorkOxford University Press. harman, gilbert, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. 1996.
http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/references.html

Extractions: References Ackrill, J.L. 1980. Aristotle on Eudaimonia. In Essays on Aristotles ethics , edited by A. O. Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press. Allais, Maurice. 1990/1979. Criticism of the postulates and axioms of the American School. In Rationality in action: contemporary approaches , edited by P. K. Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allen, Colin, Marc Bekoff, and George Lauder, eds. 1998. Natures purposes: analyses of function and design in biology . Cambridge: MIT Press (A Bradford Book). Annas, Julia. 1993. The morality of happiness . New York: Oxford University Press. Aristotle. 1984. The complete works of Aristotle: the revised Oxford translation Bollingen series LXXI:2 . Princeton: Princeton University Press. Politics: Books VII and VIII . Translated by Richard Kraut (with Commentary). Edited by J. L. Ackrill and L. Judson, Clarendon Aristotle Series . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Arnhart, Larry. 1998. Darwinian natural right: the biological ethics of human nature . Edited by D. E. Shaner, SUNY Series in Philosophy and Biology : State University of New York Press.
Accession List
philosophy Clarendon Press, 2002 BJ1012.HAR Hare, RM (Richard Mervyn) Essays inethical theory Clarendon Press, 1989 BJ1012.HAR harman, gilbert The nature of
http://www.ssl.ox.ac.uk/soc-acc-2003-02-03-2003-02-09.htm
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On Noam Chomsky critical essays / edited by gilbert harman. , harman,gilbert comp. ? ?, LCSHChomsky, Noam Addresses, essays, lectures.
http://www.lib.kyushu-u.ac.jp/cgi-bin/opac/books-query?code=21365261

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