81. Das Problem Der Universellen Realisierbarkeitbei Putnam Und Searle Translate this page searle, john R. (1980) Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3, 1980, S.417-424. searle, john R. (1990) Is the Brain a Digital Computer?. http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/magister/goldstrass-thomas-2002-11-08/HTML/N10EFE.html

Das Problem der universellen Realisierbarkeitbei Putnam und Searle Titelseite ] Kapitel: Literaturverzeichnis Seite: Inhaltsverzeichnis Literaturverzeichnis Anscombe, Gertrude E. M. Absicht Freiburg [u. a.] Alber Armstrong, David M. The Nature of Mind . Hrsg.: Ned Block Readings in Philosophy of Psychology . Bd. Cambridge Massachusetts Harvard UP S.191-199 Block, Ned What is Functionalism . Hrsg.: ders. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology . Bd. Cambridge Massachusetts Harvard UP S.171-184 Block, Ned Troubles With Functionalism . Hrsg.: ders. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology . Bd. Cambridge Massachusetts Harvard UP Block, Ned The Computer Model of the Mind . Hrsg.: D. Osherson und E. Smith An Invitation to Cognitive Science . Bd. Cambridge Massachusetts MIT Press S.247-289 Block, Ned The Mind as the Software of the Brain . Hrsg.: D. Osershon, L. Gleitman, S. Kosslyn, E. Smith und S. Sternberg An Invitation to Cognitive Science . Bd. Cambridge Massachusetts MIT Press http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/msb.html Block, Ned Functionalism (revised version) World Wide Web Januar 2002

82. Icehousebooks (author: Searle, John) Author searle, john Click ours). Books. 1 searle, john The Campus War A Sympathetic Look at the University in Agony, , , . 001651 http://www.icehousebooks.co.uk/A_searlejohn.htm

www.icehousebooks.co.uk Updated 19 Apr 2003/73 We buy and sell all kinds of second-hand and antiquarian books. Our special interests include socialist / marxist / progressive fiction and non-fiction. Home Classified lists Frosty`s igloo How to order About us ... Noticeboard Author index: A B C D ... Z Author: Searle, John ... Click the book number or to see the full description To find a title on this page, try using your browser's Find command. It's usually on the Edit menu, or you can use Ctrl+f. (This works on most web pages - not just ours) Books SEARLE, JOHN The Campus War: A Sympathetic Look at the University in Agony Home Author Index Classified lists Frosty`s igloo How to order ... Noticeboard

83. Granta: John R. Searle john R. searle. john R. searle is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkley. His most recent books are The http://www.granta.com/authors/26

Sign in Create an account Help Latest issue ... Features John R. Searle John R. Searle is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkley. His most recent books are The Rediscovery of the Mind and The Construction of Social Reality Granta Books The Mystery of Consciousness What is consciousness? Is my inner awareness of myself something separate from my body? New titles Chapters Subjects Authors Special offers Events Topsellers Forthcoming Audio top of page Home About Granta Contacts ... Features

84. Universitätsbibliothek Karlsruhe Translate this page searle, john R. Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes / john R. searle. Aus dem Amerikan. von Harvey P. Gavagai. - München Artemis und Winkler, 1993. http://www.ubka.uni-karlsruhe.de/hylib-bin/suche.cgi?opacdb=UBKA_OPAC&nd=3499771

85. Universitätsbibliothek Karlsruhe Translate this page searle, john R. Ausdruck und Bedeutung Untersuchungen zur Sprechakttheorie / john R. searle. - 2. Aufl.. - Frankfurt, M. Suhrkamp, 1990. http://www.ubka.uni-karlsruhe.de/hylib-bin/suche.cgi?opacdb=UBKA_OPAC&nd=2032159

86. Review Of Searle, The Rediscovery Of The Mind Journal of Philosophy, 60, (4), 193205, Apr. 1993. review of john searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, MIT Press, 1992, 270pp, $22.50. 1. searle s challenge. http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/searle.htm

Review of Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind Journal of Philosophy , 60, (4), 193-205, Apr. 1993. review of John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind , MIT Press, 1992, 270pp, $22.50 1. Searle's challenge Everyone agrees that consciousness is a very special phenomenon, unique in several ways, but there is scant agreement on just how special it is, and whether or not an explanation of it can be accommodated within normal science. John Searle's view, defended with passion in this book, is highly idiosyncratic: what is special about consciousness is its "subjective ontology," but normal science can accommodate subjective ontology alongside (not within) its otherwise objective ontology. Once we clear away some widespread confusions about what science requires, and dismiss the misbegotten field of cognitive science that has been engendered by those confusions, the subjective ontology of the mind, he claims, will lose its aura of unacceptable mystery. He sees himself as an iconoclast, waging lonely battle against "the tradition"the "mainstream orthodoxy" of functionalistic materialism that has unjustly captured the flag of the scientific establishment. Unsullied common sense is his chief ally, and his frequent invocations of common sense and its endorsement of his views give the book a characteristic populist flavor. Recognizing, however, that common sense has had an embarrassing history of bowing to scientific revolution in the past, Searle is particularly intent to challenge the arguments that claim that functionalism (and its family of supporting doctrines) is nothing more than an application of standard scientific method to the phenomena of mind. He identifies seven propositions that compose the "foundations of modern materialism" (p10-11), and undertakes to show that each of the seven is "at best, false."

87. What Is AI? Part 14 The Chinese Room Objection. One influential objection to strong AI, the Chinese room objection, originates with the philosopher john searle. http://www.alanturing.net/turing_archive/pages/Reference Articles/what_is_AI/Wha

AlanTuring.net Reference Articles What is Artificial Intelligence? By Jack Copeland What is Intelligence? Strong AI, Applied AI, and CS Alan Turing and the Origins of AI Early AI Programs ... For More Information... The Chinese Room Objection One influential objection to strong AI, the Chinese room objection, originates with the philosopher John Searle. Searle claims to be able to prove that no computer programnot even a computer program from the far-distant futurecould possibly think or understand. Searle's alleged proof is based on the fact that every operation that a computer is able to carry out can equally well be performed by a human being working with paper and pencil. As Turing put the point, the very function of an electronic computer is to carry out any process that could be carried out by a human being working with paper and pencil in a "disciplined but unintelligent manner". For example, one of a computer's basic operations is to compare the binary numbers in two storage locations and to write 1 in some further storage location if the numbers are the same. A human can perfectly well do this, using pieces of paper as the storage locations. To believe that strong AI is possible is to believe that intelligence can "emerge" from long chains of basic operations each of which is as simple as this one. Few accept Searle's objection, but there is little agreement as to exactly what is wrong with it. My own response to Searle, known as the

88. Citations The Mystery Of Consciousness - Searle (ResearchIndex) searle, john R. 1997. The Mystery of Consciousness. New York The New York Review of Books. searle, john R. 1997. The Mystery of Consciousness. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/context/940721/0

89. CSM - Directory searle, john B. Last Name searle. First Name john. Title Professor. Department Chemistry. BldgRoom 11-057. Work Phone (650) 574-6607. Site CSM. http://smccd.net/accounts/newcsm/webpages/directory_details.asp?cn=Searle, John

90. Dr. Roland Kehrein Translate this page searle, john R. (1975) Indirect Speech Acts. In Cole, Peter/Morgan, Jerry L. (eds.) Syntax and Semantics. searle, john R. ( 4 1998) Ausdruck und Bedeutung. http://www.staff.uni-marburg.de/~kehreinr/ws03-04.htm

Mittelseminar: Einführung in die Linguistik des Deutschen II Materialien Syntax - Grundlegendes Syntaktische Funktionen (nach Dürscheid ( Valenz-/Dependenzgrammatik Klassifikation von Attributen und Ergänzungen (nach Schmidt (1993)) Grundzüge der Generativen Grammatik Satzsemantik Pragmatik Typen illokutionärer Akte (nach Searle ( Konversationsanalyse Textlinguistik Literaturauswahl Àgel, Vilmos (2000): Valenztheorie. Tübingen: Narr. Auer, Peter (1986): Kontextualisierung. In: Studium Linguistik 19, S. 22–47. Auer, Peter (1995): Context and Contextualization. In: Verschueren, Jef [u.a.] (eds.): Handbook of Pragmatics 1995, S. 1–19. Auer, Peter (1999): Sprachliche Interaktion. Eine Einführung anhand von 22 Klassikern. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Austin, John L. (1962): How To Do Things With Words. The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bergmann, Jörg (1994): Ethnomethodologische Konversationsanalyse. In: Fritz, Gerd/Hunds­nurscher, Franz (Hrsg.): Handbuch der Dialoganalyse. Tübingen, S. 3-16 Brandt, Patrick [u.a.] (1999): Sprachwissenschaft. Ein roter Faden für das Studium. Köln [usw.]: Böhlau.

91. Interview Mit Prof. John R. Searle Translate this page Das folgende Interview entstand im Rahmen eines Autorenkolloquiums mit john searle, das unter der Leitung der Professoren Georg Meggle (Philosophie, Leipzig http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/Searle, John - Interview Ral

Interview mit Professor John R. Searle Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (1983) und The Construction of Social Reality Schon in den Speech Acts Intentionality The Construction of Social Reality die entsprechend umfassendere Institutionentheorie. ZiF Ralf Stoecker John Searle The philosophical style that dominated Oxford at the time was called "ordinary language philosophy". I never took very seriously either the exaggerated claims that were sometimes made about the value of the methods of analyzing expressions in ordinary language, nor did I take seriously the unreasonable attacks on these methods in philosophy. However, it does seem to me that we benefited enormously from the obsession with rigor and clarity that characterized Oxford at the time. I have found that though there are limitations on how much you can do with ordinary language analysis in solving traditional philosophical problems, the methods of logical analysis that I learned as a student in Oxford, I believe, are universal in application, and I have tried to apply them to problems of the philosophy of mind, and in social philosophy as well. Ralf Stoecker: John Searle: Ralf Stoecker : Intentionality and consciousness are sometimes taken to be the two core topics, the crunch points, in the philosophy of mind. Yet, you don't agree that these really are two separate issues, do you?

92. The Failures Of Computationalism Pp. 6873. The Failures of Computationalism. john R. searle Department of Philosophy University of California Berkeley CA searle@cogsci.berkeley.edu. http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/Searle, John - The Failures

Harnad, S. (1993) Grounding Symbols in the Analog World with Neural Nets. Think 2: 12 - 78 (Special Issue on "Connectionism versus Symbolism" D.M.W. Powers & P.A. Flach, eds.). Pp. 68-73. The Failures of Computationalism John R. Searle Department of Philosophy University of California Berkeley CA searle@cogsci.berkeley.edu The Power in the Chinese Room. Harnad and I agree that the Chinese Room Argument deals a knockout blow to Strong AI, but beyond that point we do not agree on much at all. So let's begin by pondering the implications of the Chinese Room. The Chinese Room shows that a system, me for example, could pass the Turing Test for understanding Chinese, for example, and could implement any program you like and still not understand a word of Chinese. Now, why? What does the genuine Chinese speaker have that I in the Chinese Room do not have? The answer is obvious. I, in the Chinese room, am manipulating a bunch of formal symbols; but the Chinese speaker has more than symbols, he knows what they mean. That is, in addition to the syntax of Chinese, the genuine Chinese speaker has a semantics in the form of meaning, understanding, and mental contents generally. But, once again, why? Why can't I in the Chinese room also have a semantics? Because all I have is a program and a bunch of symbols, and programs are defined syntactically in terms of the manipulation of the symbols. The Chinese room shows what we should have known all along: syntax by itself is not sufficient for semantics. (Does anyone actually deny this point, I mean straight out? Is anyone actually willing to say, straight out, that they think that syntax, in the sense of formal symbols, is really the same as semantic content, in the sense of meanings, thought contents, understanding, etc.?)

93. Rationalite Et Realisme : Qu’est-ce Qui Est En Jeu ? - John Searle Translate this page *, La construction de la réalité sociale de john R. searle. par john R. searle - professeur de philosophie à l’Université de Californie, Berkeley. http://peccatte.karefil.com/SearleRR.html

Rationalité et réalisme : qu’est-ce qui est en jeu ? par John R. Searle - professeur de philosophie à l’Université de Californie, Berkeley en tant qu’idéaux . Et ceci et nouveau. Je poursuivrai en essayant d’identifier quelques-uns des éléments des conceptions occidentales de la rationalité et du réalisme qui sont actuellement en question. Mon but n’est pas tant de résoudre les différends que d’identifier (au moins en partie) ce qui est exactement en cause. Je discuterai également certaines conséquences des conceptions différentes de la rationalité et du réalisme sur l’éducation supérieure. Il ne s’agit pas des seuls problèmes du débat actuel sur l’enseignement supérieur, pas plus que des seules questions théoriques ou philosophiques sur ce même sujet, mais ces questions et problèmes méritent d’être discutés, et autant que je le sache, n’ont pas été abordés en ces termes auparavant Les traditions occidentales : quelques préliminaires à partir d’un point de vue et selon certains aspects et pas d’autres - constitue l’un des principes épistémiques essentiels de la tradition rationaliste occidentale dans son incarnation actuelle.

94. SEARLE, JOHN R. - Prometeo Libros - Libreria De Ciencias Sociales Translate this page searle, john R.,Libros de las Ciencias Sociales. 250.000 reflexionar Usted buscó Autor searle, john R. Se encontraron 7 títulos. http://www.prometeolibros.com/resulta.asp?qrytexto=131074&qrycateg=id_author

95. John Searle's Ideas About Social Reality - Book Information john searle s Ideas about Social Reality. Extensions, Criticisms, and Reconstructions. Edited By DAVID KOEPSELL, University of Buffalo http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/book.asp?ref=1405112581&site=1

96. John Searle And His Critics - Book Information john searle and his Critics. For more than three decades john searle has been developing and elaborating a unified theory of language and mind. http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/book.asp?ref=0631187022&site=1

97. 620pixeltable MIND THE GUFF john searle s Thinking on Consciousness and Free Will Examined john searle is not only the king of American standup philosophers. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwVariousHonderichonSearle.htm

MIND THE GUFF John Searle's Thinking on Consciousness and Free Will Examined by Ted Honderich The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website This a piece mostly about a recent one by Searle in an issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies . The issue carried the title 'Mind the Gap'. Persons who have not had the satisfaction of riding on the London subway may not know that that title is an echo of an awful instruction by loudspeaker to passengers stepping off the train at some stations where there is an empty space between the train and the platform. My title gives another warning. This piece too has now been published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. Searle's piece, by the way, reappeared in his Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture in February 2001. Abstract: (I) John Searle's conception of consciousness in the 'Mind the Gap' issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies remains short on content, no advance on either materialism or traditional dualism. Still, it is sufficiently contentful to be self-contradictory. And so his Biological Subjectivity on Two Levels, like materialism and dualism, needs replacing by a radically different conception of consciousness such as Consciousness as Existence. (II) From his idea that we can discover 'gaps', seeming absences of causal circumstances, in our experience of deciding and acting, Searle is led to the positing of a self and to mysterious causing. (III) In fact philosophers of determinism and freedom over three centuries have concerned themselves with what are now termed 'gaps'. Searle's advance is a useful terminological one. Compatibilist philosophers of freedom, contrary to what is said, have not missed any point at all. A successor to both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism is needed. (IV) Searle's previous account of deciding and acting in Biological Subjectivity on Two Levels does indeed fail because of its epiphenomenalism. (V) The culmination of his paper, his preferred hypothesis now about deciding and acting, is that down-up causation is true of it but not left-right causation. Quantum Theory as often interpreted doesn't work down-up but does work left-right. The hypothesis is entirely in the tradition of the Incompatibilist and Libertarian philosophers of determinism and freedom, whom Searle has joined, but is factually incredible.

98. The Searl Effect All content from site is (C)opyrighted by DISC Inc. Please contact DISC Inc. before reprinting / reposting any information contained within. http://www.searleffect.com/

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99. Les Recherches De Carnet Psy http://www.carnetpsy.com/Archives/Recherches/Items/p14.htm

Archives Recherches John Searle, John Searle est l'un des plus célèbres philosophes nord américains. En 1969, il publia Les Actes de langage (Éditions Hermann, 1972), un livre important de philosophie du langage sur les actes de parole. Depuis une vingtaine d'années, il aborde aussi des questions de philosophie de l'esprit comme en témoignent la publication, en 1980, d'un article qui fit couler beaucoup d'encre, "Minds, Brains and Programs", en 1983, la publication de L'intentionnalité (Éditions Minuit, 1985) et la parution, en 1992, de son avant dernier livre, La Redécouverte de l'esprit (RE) (Éditions Gallimard). Que l'état d'un module cognitif puisse ou non être qualifié de "mental" me semble secondaire. Mais ce qui sépare Searle des tenants du paradigme computationnel, c'est qu'ils supposent que l'état d'un module cognitif d'un individu peut conjointement avoir un contenu représentationnel - posséder l'intentionnalité - et être inaccessible à la conscience de l'individu au sens fort. Le premier défaut tient à l'emploi insuffisamment discriminatoire du terme "conscience": non seulement Searle omet de distinguer le fait qu'un état soit accessible à la conscience d'un individu et le fait qu'un état possède éventuellement une qualité phénoménale, mais surtout il a tort de ne pas distinguer la notion d'état conscient et la notion de personne consciente. Faute de cette distinction, il se prive, à mon avis, de la voie principale qui permet d'analyser la notion d'état conscient. C'est sans doute la raison pour laquelle il épouse (à tort) la thèse de la priorité de la conscience sur l'intentionnalité.

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