| Effect of Administration's Statements In his deposition, Dr. Shields said that the Administration told the Pathet Lao during Operation Homecoming that it had certain knowledge that the LPF was holding American prisoners even though the Administration was, in fact, not certain. The purpose, according to Dr. Shields, was to put as much pressure as possible on the LPF in the event that prisoners were being held. This was not the approach taken by the Administration in its post- Homecoming statements. The evidence is that the primary purpose of the public statements during this period was not to put pressure on the DRV or LPF, but rather to avoid raising the hopes of POW/MIA families. During a WSAG meeting, before the Peace accords were signed, one Defense Department official warned against a repetition of the Korean War experience, when all missing Americans not known to be dead were officially presumed to be alive. The DOD official argued that such a policy raised expectations that were unrealistic and painful and impossible to resolve. Unfortunately, the approach that was adopted may have served neither the purpose of pressuring our former adversaries nor the goal of easing family concerns. As Ambassador Lord testified: [O]nce you announce that [all of the POWs are home, and that you have no indications any remain alive in Indochina,] you lose any leverage you have on the Lao and the North Vietnamese. If you're publicly saying we have no indication, how can you press them privately or any other way to release? So it undercuts any leverage you have with them. That's one aspect, leaving aside whether it's a strange reversal of our actual calculations and whether there's any dissembling here, but just in terms of pressing North Vietnam and Laos, you're losing your leverage. They'll say: Well, you announced that you didn't have any. . . . Leaving aside the human and other political dimensions, it's terrible [negotiating strategy]. You lose all your leverage with the other side. Meanwhile, the Defense Department's effort to keep POW/MIA family expectations in line with its perception of the reality ran into a wall of human emotion. The Administration's optimistic statements about what the peace agreement would produce caused families to expect more answers than actually were forthcoming. Although the Administration's statements seemed designed to help families accept the likelihood that their loved ones would not be returning alive, many families could notand would notaccept this conclusion without proof. Neither Dr. Shields nor any other Administration spokesman ever said publicly that "all our POWs are dead." They never ruled out, in public testimony, the possibility that some POWs might have been left behind. They expressed dissatisfaction with the lists received from the DRV, and especially the DRV/Laos list, and stressed the importance of efforts to account for the missing. But the fact remains that the period for public confrontation with the DRV and Pathet Lao over POW/MIAs ended with Operation Homecoming. The hard questions that the Defense Department had about prisoners were no longer raised at press conferences, butif at allin private sessions with the DRV or LPF. The emphasis on Americans known to have been captured was replaced by a far broader and less confrontational search for the "missing." And the ongoing accusations of violations of the agreement and threats of military action directed against the DRV were prompted not by the DRV's failure to comply with the POW/MIA provisions of the agreement, but by issues of infiltration and military re-supply of the South. Meetings between Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, May/June, 1973 Due to continued allegations of ceasefire violations by all sides, Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho met in Paris in May and June of 1973 for the purpose of getting the implementation of the peace agreement back on track. In anticipation of these meetings, Secretary of Defense Richardson sent a memorandum to the White House in April 1973 urging Dr. Kissinger to lean hard on the North Vietnamese on the subject of POWs in Laos. Secretary Richardson remained very concerned about the possibility that live American POWs were still being held captive by the Pathet Lao, and he wanted Dr. Kissinger to do everything he could to obtain additional information concerning that possibility. In testimony before the Select Committee, Dr. Kissinger said that the POW/MIA issue played an important role in these meetings: We never accepted the proposition that they (U.S. POWs) are all dead, continued to express our dissatisfaction with respect to the accounting for MIAs, and pressed as hard as we could for an execution of their commitments. Between May and June, 1973, I conducted 12 days of talks with the North Vietnamese. I reviewed in detail the North's violations, incuding the failure to account for all of the MIAs, but Hanoi sensed our leverage was rapidly eroding. A host of Congressional resolutions made it clear that we would have no support for military action. On May 31st, the Senate rejected a Republican sponsored amendment which would have made the cutoff of American military activity in Laos and Cambodia contingent upon the North Vietnamese making a good faith effort to account for the MIAs. In response to my presentations, Le Duc Tho disdainfully read me editorials from the American press and speeches from the Congressional Record. . . Despite all these obstacles, strenuous negotiations resulted in a joint communique on June 13th, reaffirming and strengthening all the POW provisions, including those with respect to missing in action of the original agreement. It was again violated and ignored. We made no secret of our outrage with Hanoi's violation. During 1973, we delivered at least 30 separate public statements or private messages to that effect. The record does, indeed, reflect that the United States protested frequently the DRV's unwillingness to fulfill its obligations under the PPA concerning Americans missing in Vietnam. These protests were ordinarily delivered through the Four Party Joint Military Team and are discussed below. During his discussions with Le Duc Tho, Dr. Kissinger pressed his view that Article 8(b) of the Paris Peace Accords, dealing with accounting for the missing in action, was applicable not only in Vietnam, but throughout Indochina. Specifically, Dr. Kissinger asked Le Duc Tho for a private pledge that the DRV would assist in obtaining an accounting of Americans missing in Laos. Le Duc Tho replied only that "we have to cooperate with our Lao friends because it is their sovereignty." Le Duc Tho also said that if Dr. Kissinger wished to assert, "for the purpose of public opinion," that article 8(b) is applicable to all of Indochina, the DRV "will say nothing about it." In addition, the record indicates that during a May 23, 1973, meeting with Le Duc Tho, Dr. Kissinger asked the North Vietnamese to state publicly that there were no more live American POWs in Laos. As part of a "Draft Understanding on Laos," Dr. Kissinger proposed that the following language be made a part of the joint communique: "The DRV side has been informed that there are no U.S. prisoners being held in Laos." Dr. Kissinger:. . . we would still like a sentence from you which I don't understand why you can't give uswhich says that "the DRV has been informed there are no U.S. prisoners being held in Laosthat all the prisoners held in Laos have been released." It would be very important for us. Le Duc Tho: I have acknowledged to you that all of them have been released. Dr. Kissinger: Then why can't you write it down? Despite Dr. Kissinger's request, Le Duc Tho refused to say publicly that no live U.S. POWs remained in Laos. As during the pre-Accords negotiations, Le Duc Tho would not agree to make any public statements which indicated either explicitly or implicitly North Vietnam's control of the Pathet Lao. Dr. Kissinger was asked about this exchange during a hearing before the Select Committee: Sen. Kerry:. . . So here you are in May with Le Duc Tho saying not. . . we need an accounting, but saying, give us a sentence that says there's nobody alive in Laos, it will be helpful to us. Dr. Kissinger: You know, Mr. Chairman, it is a really bizarre situation when the people who were parading and keeping us from doing the things we needed to do are now telling us what sentences we should have used after all our leverage was taken away from us. Sen. Kerry: Sir, this is a filibuster. I mean, I am not doing that. I am asking you why it is that you did not present the case but said just give us a sentence that there is no one alive. Dr. Kissinger: I presented the case, Mr. Chairman, in February. We Sen. Kerry: Why would you have been satisfied with a sentence? Dr. Kissinger: I wasn't satisfied, Mr. Chairman. I was dealing here with a man who knew reality. I had no means of pressure left. I had no economic aid left. The Congress was in the process of passing a series of resolutions that banned military action, and all I could do was bluff my way through this due to the actions that were taken by the Congress of the United States, and as I said in my statement, it does not behoove the Senate to blame me for what sentences I may or may not have used in circumstances which would have been totally Sen. Kerry: But this goes to the gravamen of the issue, Mr. Secretary. It really does. If you were to be satisfied with a sentence that says no one is alive, it'll help us, rather than to suggest to him that if you don't tell us what happened we can resume the bombing, there's a difference about what was being done about POWs, and the fact is that subsequent to this, despite the fact that you sit here and now say to me, our leverage is being taken away, you recommended bombing after this meeting to enforce other elements of the ceasefire, but not POWs. Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, you're just playing with documents. Sen. Kerry: I'm playing with the facts. Dr. Kissinger: Of course, you take the position that people who were meeting with families all during the war, who had every incentive to get theseto want theseand every obligation to get these prisoners returned were bombing for one reason rather than another reason. I tell you, Mr. Chairman, if we had had the authority, we would have had another major negotiation. In the context where every newspaper, where every Congressional Committee was preventing us from exercising the leverage, I it is very easy to second-guess 20 years (later). . . things taken out of the whole stream in which you don't even know what I said to Le Duc Tho in private conversations because the record willwell, the record won't show it, because generally when I threatened Le Duc Tho I did not do it on the record. The legal adviser to Dr. Kissinger during the May/June talks with Le Duc Tho was George Aldrich. His recollections indicate that, although the question of missing Americans was discussed, the possibility that some POWs might still be alive was not. Mr. Aldrich: My memories and my notes on those meetings indicate that the principal discussions of nonreturn of prisoners related to the nonreturn of prisoners between the Vietnamese parties, not ours. Our concern as expressed was about the accounting in Laos. It was not a concern about nonreturn. Sen. Kerry: But at that time there was an issue of nonreturn. Mr. Aldrich: Not in my view. I was not told there was any issue, sir. Sen. Kerry: You had no recollection of any issue at that time, then, and no one had put in front of you at that time in May a question about people not accounted for in Laos. Mr. Aldrich: It was not, as far as I can recall, ever suggested to me that prisoners in Laos had not been returned. On June 13, 1973, the United States and the DRV signed a joint communique pledging mutual support for full implementation of the Paris Accords. Point 8 of the communique states that: In conformity with article 8 of the Agreement, (a) any captured personnel covered by Article 8(a) of the Agreement who have not been returned shall be returned without delay, and in any event within no more than 30 days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique. . . in conformity with Article 8(b) of the agreement, the parties shall help each other to get infornmation about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action. In his statement to the press, Dr. Kissinger interpreted the communique as requiring both sides to make "major efforts to help each other to account for the missing in action throughout Indochina." As promised, Le Duc Tho said nothing to contradict Dr. Kissinger's statement. Unfortunately, the Committee found no evidence that the DRV undertook the "major efforts" hoped for by Dr. Kissinger. Status Change Policy Federal law provides the secretaries of the military services with exclusive authority to determine initially and later change the casualty classifications of personnel captured (POW), killed (KIA) or missing in action (MIA). Although the status classification process is subject to guidelines set forth in the statute and to certain constitutional due process guarantees, it nevertheless remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of the service secretaries. Throughout the course of the Vietnam War, status changes were made in accordance with the conventional practice. On May 22, 1973, however, acting Secretary of Defense William Clements received a routine memorandum from the DIA concerning Americans unaccounted for after Operation Homecoming. The memo stated that: The Military Services are not considering any status changes at this time from missing to captured. However, one case involving an American civilianMr. Emmet Kay who was lost over Laos on 7 May 1973is under review by the Department of State and this Agency for possible change of status from missing to captured. For reasons that remain unclear to the Select Committee, Secretary Clements wrote on the bottom of the memo: I want a memo sent to all departments (Services-ASD-DIA- JCS) etc. that any reclassification from MIA to POW must first be cleared by me/MIA to KIA ok within each service and no review by me. The requested memorandum was prepared by Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Hill and was issued over Secretary Clements' signature on June 8, 1973. As ordered, the memo directed that the service secretaries present to him for his personal review and approval all proposed status changes from MIA to POW. No such requirement was imposed for proposed status changes from POW to MIA or KIA, or from MIA to KIA. The memo, in its entirety, reads: I request that all actions which recommend reclassification of military personnel from missing in action to captured status be submitted to me for approval. Proposed reclassification actions should be first routed through the Assistant Secretary of defense for International Security Affairs for preliminary review before referral to me. In his deposition, Mr. Clements said that the service secretaries presented between 50 and 75 cases to him over the next several months pursuant to this directive. In each case, according to Mr. Clements, it was recommended that a serviceman's status be changed from MIA to POW. Mr. Clements recalled that, in his judgment, the intelligence information in every one of these cases fell short of his standards for POW status. Mr. Clements accordingly denied the status change request in each instance. Mr. Clements' memorandum and testimony during his deposition concerning it were peculiar for a number of reasons. First, the memo reflected a departure from legally required procedures under which status changes were the exclusive prerogative of the service secretaries. Second, the policy reflected in the June 8 memo is contrary to another memo, sent by Secretary Clements to President Nixon on July 17, 1973, in which he said that decisions about status changes should continue to be made by the service secretaries "as established by law and experience." The Secretary did not inform the President that he had, himself, ordered the Department to follow a different policy. Third, Mr. Clements opened his public testimony before the Select Committee on September 24, 1992 by stating that status changes were handled exclusively by the services throughout his tenure at DoD: Within DoD, the services control classification, in the sense that when you have your POWs or MIAs or KIAs, those classifications are service-classified. The Department of Defense, as you would think of my position in the office of the Secretary of Defense, we do not do that. We did not then do that. Now, exactly what they would do at this time, I don't know. But at that time, those classifications were held within the services. In other words, the Navy classified their people, Army did theirs, and the Air Force did theirs. I want to make that very clear because it's important that your committee and the public at large understand that the office of the Secretary of Defense and/or the State Department and/or the National Security Council, nor the President. . . had any control whatsoever over classification. That was strictly within the services. Fourth, during the public hearing, Mr. Clements did not recall or at any rate seem to grasp the significance of the June 8, 1973 memorandum: Sen. Smith: Why did you, Governor Clements, make a decision to not allow your service secretaries. . . to upgrade an individual from an MIA category to a POW category? Why did you make that decision? Governor Clements: I don't think that I made such a decision. Sen. Smith: You did not make that decision. Is that your statement? Governor Clements: I have no recollection of making a decision of that kind. Let me tell you something, Senator, it is very, very clear that only classification can be changed within the service. And let's don't get that confused. Sen. Smith: (reads text of June 8 memo aloud) That was June 8th, 1973. Governor Clements: That's right. Sen. Smith: With your signature. Governor Clements: And there's nothing wrong with that. . . Sen. Smith: Governor, you directed the Secretaries to route it all through you on June 8th. And on July 17th, you wrote to the President of the United States and you said: In my view, the status determination process, as established by law and experience, should be allowed to function as prescribed. . . Governor Clements: I agree with that. Sen. Smith: That is what you said to the President, but that is not what you said on June 8th to the service secretaries. Governor Clements: I disagree completely. Sen. Smith: Well. . . I am not going to argue with you, Governor. It is a part of the record. Governor Clements: Well, you don't have to argue with me, just read it again. . . Sen. Smith: Governor, I have got it in your own handwriting. . . "I want a memo sent to all departments, services, ASD, DIA, JCS, that any reclassification from MIA to POW must first be cleared by me." That is what you said. Governor Clements: I want to review Sen. Smith: In your own handwriting. Governor Clements: I want to review every one of them. That's exactly right. This was a very, very delicate issue. The most peculiar aspect of all this is that the Select Committee has discovered no documentary or testimonial evidence to indicate that Mr. Clements ever actually reviewed any particular status classification cases, let alone the 50 to 75 cases he cited in his deposition. Indeed, Dr. Shields, who would certainly have known if such a review ever occurred, told the Committee: Mr. Chairman, I don't want to interject here, but. . . I can't recall of a single case where they (the services) wanted to reclassify a missing person to prisoner status. Finally, the Committee located a July 17, 1973 memorandum from Mr. Clements to the President and an August 17, 1973 memorandum to the Service Secretaries concerning further status changes. The July 17 memorandum stated: Presently, there are 1,278 military personnel unaccounted for. . .Of this number, 67 are officially listed as prisoner of war based on information that they reached the ground safely and were captured. . . The rest have remained in a missing status. . .In a significant number of cases only faint hope was ever held for the individual's survival. Although our returned prisoners could confirm the death of less than 100 men, they are of the firm opinion that none of the other missing men entered the captivity system. . . In addition, high level officials from the other side have repeatedly emphasized that none of the missing are still being held captive. Absence of new information indicating a man is alive constitutes implicit confirmation of prior evidence in those cases where chances for survival were deemed small. A determination of death should now be made in those cases. The August 17 memorandum directed: the Secretaries of the Military Departments to proceed as prescribed by law with changes in status to deceased, where warranted, of servicemen who did not return from Southeast Asia. Phase-out of the POW/MIA Task Force In an internal Pentagon memorandum dated February 13, 1971, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird established a POW/MIA Task Force to serve as the coordinating body within DOD for all POW/MIA- related issues: The primary function of the Task Group will be to provide close and continuing coordination of all activities in DOD in the PW/MIA area. In accord with policy guidance, it will ensure that responsible offices and agencies work together in planning, programming, assessing, and carrying out all required actions. Secretary Laird placed the Task Force under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and appointed Roger Shields as chairman of the Task Force. In a follow-up memorandum dated December 3, 1971, Secretary Laird reemphasized the importance of coordination within DOD and directed that all POW/MIA issues be forwarded to Dr. Shields: The best interests of the Defense Department, the men, and their families require the closest and most thorough coordination of every aspect of the conduct of prisoner of war/missing in action affairs. To this end, Dr. Roger Shields, of the office of the Assistant Secretary (ISA), has been tasked with overall Department of Defense coordination responsibility for all PW/MIA matters. I ask that you direct all elements of your organization to coordinate with Dr. Shields, or his staff (PW Task Force), all actions related to prisoners of war or missing in action. I consider this to be the only way in which we can satisfactorily handle this difficult problem, and I earnestly solicit your cooperation to this purpose. Consistent with Secretary Laird's directives, Dr. Shields acted as DOD's leading policymaker for POW/MIA issues right up through the aftermath of Operation Homecoming. Dr. Shields served as DOD's primary POW/MIA spokesperson with the Congress, the families and the public; as the coordinator of the Department's intelligence assets assigned to the POW/MIA issue; and as coordinator of Operation Homecoming. Nevertheless, DOD moved to abolish the POW/MIA Task Force almost immediately after the completion of Operation Homecoming. In a memorandum dated April 25, 1973, acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Lawrence Eagleburger recommended that the Task Force be phased out over a four-month period: With the recent ceasefire agreement in both Vietnam and Laos and the return of our servicemen held captive by the Communist side, the PW/MIA situation no longer warrants the retention of the PW/MIA Task Force in its present size or configuration. Accordingly, this Task Force should be phased out over the next four months and those functional areas currently being performed by the Task Force should be reassigned to the Military Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and OSD Component Staff Agencies, as appropriate. Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson approved Mr. Eagleburger's recommendation on May 1, 1973 and issued a memorandum ordering the phase-out of the POW/MIA Task Force by August 31, 1973. Secretary Richardson wrote: The recent peace agreements in Vietnam and Laos, along with the withdrawal of our military forces from Vietnam and the return of our prisoners of war provide a basis for the phase-out of the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Task Force and the functional reorganization of the DoD PW/MIA program. In this regard, I hasten to add that the phase-out of the Task Force in no way infers that those on-going programs and long-range actions on behalf of our returned servicemen, their families, and the missing in action will be terminated. Instead, a need exists for a redistribution of functional responsibilities currently being accomplished by the PW/MIA Task Force. The Select Committee looked closely at the rapid phase-out of the Task Force to try to determine whether it was indicative of a larger U.S. Government effort to downplay lingering doubts about the completeness of the release of American POWs from North Vietnam and Laos. Both of the memoranda cited above appear premised on the view that no live American POWs remained behind in Indochinaa premise possibly at odds with information known to the Administration. Yet, Secretary Richardson, Secretary Schlesinger and Dr. Shields all testified that the phase-out order was a mere bureaucratic shuffling of resources within DOD that did not result in any real decrease in the Department's deployment of POW/MIA assets. In fact, Dr. Shields was soon promoted to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and he remained at DOD in charge of POW/MIA matters through 1976. Joint Economic Commission As discussed earlier, the formation of the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was announced on February 14, 1973 following Dr. Kissinger's visit to Hanoi. Formal meetings began the next month in Paris with Maurice J. Williams heading the American delegation. The public position taken by the Administration was still that no specific dollar figures had been discussed with the North Vietnamese; that the provision of aid would depend on DRV compliance with the ceasefire and other terms of the PPA; and that no assistance would be provided without authorization from the Congress. By the end of March, although it was not revealed publicly at the time, the two sides had reached tentative agreement on a detailed five year plan for reconstruction. All that was lacking was an agreed mechanism for DRV reporting on how the aid would be used. On April 5, 1973, the U.S. Senate voted 88-3 to bar the use of any previously-appropriated funds for the purpose of providing assistance to the DRV. Although the amendment did not prohibit the President from proposing a reconstruction program for North Vietnam, the tone of the debate indicated that such a proposal would not have much support. On April 19, the JEC talks were suspended by the U.S. as a result of alleged violations by the DRV of the ceasefire. Talks did not resume until after the joint U.S.-North Vietnamese communique of June 13, 1973 pledging adherence to the terms of the PPA. Talks were then held from June 19 until July 23, after which they were suspended indefinitely due to the DRV's failure to stop military actions directed against South Vietnam. Four Party Joint Military Team The Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT), based in Saigon, came into existence immediately after the end of Operation Homecoming and was charged with responsibility for implementing article 8(b) of the PPA. Article 8(b) provides for mutual assistance in obtaining information about those considered missing in action, determining the location of graves and providing for the repatriation of remains. On April 14, 1973, Ellsworth Bunker, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, outlined proposed priorities for the FPJMT in a cable to the Secretary of State. Ambassador Bunker said that the first priority would be recovery of the remains of those listed by the DRV and PRG as having died while in captivity. The second priority would be to seek information on the so-called discrepancy cases Americans thought by the U.S. to have been captured alive. The third priority would be to negotiate a process for the air and ground search of crash sites. Although meetings of the FPJMT were held regularly beginning in early April, very little was accomplished. Colonel Laurence Robson, who served as Deputy Chief of the FPJMT, testified that folders describing 104 cases of American POW/MIAs about whom the DRV should have information were turned over to the North Vietnamese. Many of these had previously been brought to the DRV's attention during Dr. Kissinger's visit to Hanoi in February. In April, as in February, however, the U.S. received no response. Despite two visits to purported U.S. POW grave sites in North Vietnam, no remains were repatriated. According to Col. Robson, part of the DRV's refusal to cooperate may have resulted from the opposition demonstrated in Congress to the provision of reconstruction aid. And in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in December, 1973, Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger Shields characterized the actual meetings as consisting of "propaganda speeches, boycotts, walkouts, and general stalling tactics by the Communist delegations." Efforts to Gain an Accounting in Laos At the time Operation Homecoming was completed, there remained hope within the U.S. that Pathet Lao officials would admit holding at least a small number of U.S. POWs and provide information on any who might have died in captivity. There was particular attention given to individuals, such as David Hrdlicka, Eugene DeBruin and Charles Shelton, who were known to have been taken captive by the LPF. American hopes were based, to a significant extent, on previous admissions that the LPF did hold U.S. prisoners. Beginning in early April, however, the LPF position changed. On April 5, U.S. Embassy officials were told by Soth Petrasy in Vientiane that the LPF held no U.S. prisoners. The same message was conveyed by Soth the following day in a meeting with Senator Edward Brooke. As a result of these meetings, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, McMurtrie Godley, cabled the State Department that: Although. . . U.S. PW's may be held in remote areas of PL (Pathet Lao) zone of control, we. . . received negative response. Embassy activity is currently being directed toward program of accounting for MIAs. . . Although U.S. Mission through the years has utilized every possible means to obtain valid information concerning MIA's in Laos, we have been unable to identify conclusively any U.S. personnel being held captive or identify conclusively a specific detention facility for U.S. Prisoners. . . On April 23, at a press conference, Soth Petrasy was asked whether it was possible that American prisoners were still being held. He replied: It is not possible. First of all, we do not recognize your list. All who were captured have been released. They came to massacre us and we had to defend ourselves. If they reached the ground alive, they could still die without ever being found. But if they were captured, they were released. If they wanted to stay alive, they should have stayed in the United States. On May 31, 1973, Mr. Frank Sieverts, special assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State for Prisoners of War and Men Missing in Action, testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding efforts to account for Americans missing in Laos: In Laos, U.S. officials have been in direct contact with representatives of the Lao Patriotic Front (the Pathet Lao) to press for additional information on Americans missing or captured in Laos. We have told the communist side of our concern at the small number of Americans listed as captured in Laos, in view of past hints that a larger number were held by Pathet Lao forces, and in view of evidence that at least two others had been captured in Laos. The communist side has repeatedly told us and has recently stated publicly that there are no more Americans captured or held in Laos. They have also said that further accounting for the missing must await the formation of a coalition government, as specified in the February 21 Laos ceasefire agreement. Our efforts to convince the Communist side to proceed with this accounting without waiting for a new government to be formed has been in vain. On September 14, 1973, the Protocols to the February 21 Laos Ceasfire Agreement were signed between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Lao Government. Article 18 of the Protocols called for the "return of all persons regardless of nationality who were captured and imprisoned for cooperating with the other side during the war (to be) accomplished in three stages and completed at the same time as the withdrawal of foreign troops and military personnel." The protocol also required an exchange of lists of prisoners and those who died in captivity within 30 days of the signing of the agreement on September 14, a provision that was subsequently disregarded by the LPF. At the end of the 30 day period for the lists of prisoners to be exchanged, a group of POW/MIA family members traveled to Vientiane, Laos in anticipation of receiving information on persons unaccounted for in Laos. The family members met with Soth Petrasy, but no information concerning their loved ones was provided. On December 5, 1973, Mr. Sieverts again testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee: The Lao Patriotic Front has repeatedly stated, publicly and directly to senior U.S. officials, that there are no more American prisoners captured or held in Laoswith the exception of a civilian, Emmet Kay, a pilot for Continental Air Services, Inc., whose plane went down in Northwest Laos May 7, 1973. . . Our representatives have. . . provided the Communist side with a detailed listing of our POW/MIA's in Laos, including those listed as dead whose bodies were not recovered, with the request for information on those men. We have also called particular attention to the cases of men who were previously acknowledged as captured in Laos, or for whom there are indications that they survived shootdowns. . . As is clear form the foregoing, our representatives in Vientiane have maintained continuing pressure on the communist side on this subject. . . The Pathet Lao representative, however, . . . said no information would be forthcoming until. . . the coalition government was formed. On the question of JCRC access to Laos, the Pathet Lao representative flatly stated that no outside element could concern itself with POW/MIA's in what he described as the "liberated zone.." . . The vast majority of crash and potential grave sites in Laos are located in areas under the control of North Vietnamese forces. Thus, North Vietnam effectively controls the basic information on this subject. We have attempted to raise it with them in the FPJMT in Saigon, but they have insisted that POW/MIA's in Laos must be discussed with the LPF. Although the Lao Provisional Government was finally formed in April 1974, no information concerning U.S. POWs or MIAs was forthcoming from the new government. In a report dated August 16, 1974, the DIA reported that 294 Americans remained unaccounted for in Laos, of whom 5 were known to have been captured. According to the report, Special Intelligence (SI) indicated that: . Navy pilot Barton S. Creed may have been captured but was probably dead; . Air Force pilot David Hrdlicka, a known captive, was believed to have died in mid-1966; . Eugene Debruin, acknowledged as captive by the Pathet Lao, had probably not survived; . Air Force pilot Charles Shelton, a known captive, had probably died in mid-1966: and . the civilian pilot Emmet Kay, downed in May, 1973, remained in captivity. (Kay was released in September, 1974). During his de-brief, Emmet Kay stated that he had no knowledge of any other Americans being held in Laos. He also said that he had been told by the Pathet Lao that he was the only American being held there and that all U.S. POWs were released in 1973 during Operation Homecoming. The coalition government in Laos was replaced in December, 1975 by a government controlled entirely by the Pathet Lao. | |
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